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Abstract
This paper presents a novel leaderless protocol (FPC-BI: Fast
Probabilistic Consensus within Byzantine Infrastructures) with a low
communicational complexity and which allows a set of nodes to come
to a consensus on a value of a single bit. The paper makes the as-
sumption that part of the nodes are Byzantine, and are thus controlled
by an adversary who intends to either delay the consensus, or break
it. This defines that at least a couple of honest nodes come to dif-
ferent conclusions. We prove that, nevertheless, the protocol works
with high probability when its parameters are suitably chosen. Along
this the paper also provides explicit estimates on the probability that
the protocol finalizes in the consensus state in a given time. This
protocol could be applied to reaching consensus in decentralized cryp-
tocurrency systems. A special feature of it is that it makes use of a
sequence of random numbers which are either provided by a trusted
source or generated by the nodes themselves using some decentralized
random number generating protocol. This increases the overall trust-
worthiness of the infrastructure. A core contribution of the paper is
that it uses a very weak consensus to obtain a strong consensus on the
value of a bit, and which can relate to the validity of a transaction.
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1 Introduction
Increasingly, distributed systems need to provide a consensus on the current
state of the infrastructure within given time limits, and to a high degree of
accuracy. At the core of cryptocurrency transactions, for example, is that
miners must achieve a consensus on the current state of transactions. This
works well when all the nodes are behaving correctly, but a malicious agent
could infect the infrastructure, and try and change the consensus [1].
Suppose that there is a network composed of n nodes, and these nodes
need to come to consensus on the value of a bit. Some of these nodes, how-
ever, may belong to an adversary, an entity which aims to delay the consensus
or prevent it from happening altogether. This paper focuses on this situation
- and which is typical in the cryptocurrency applications - when the num-
ber n of nodes is large, and where they are possibly (geographically) spread
out. This makes the communicational costs important whereas computa-
tional complexity and the memory usage are often of a lesser concern.
1.1 Key contributions
The key contribution of this paper is a protocol which allow a larger number
of adversarial nodes, and which may be a (fixed) proportion of the total
number of nodes, while keeping the communicational complexity low (see
Corollary 4.3). It then guarantees fast convergence for all initial conditions.
It is important to note that here we do not require that with high probability
the consensus should be achieved on the initial majority value. Rather, what
we need, is:
(i) if, initially, no significant majority1 of nodes prefer 1, then the final
consensus should be 0 whp2;
(ii) if, initially, a supermajority3 of nodes prefer 1, then the final consensus
should be 1 whp.
1loosely speaking, a significant majority is something statistically different from the
50/50 situation; for example, the proportion of 1-opinion is greater than α for some fixed
α > 1/2
2“whp” = “with high probability”
3again, this is a loosely defined notion; a supermajority is something already close to
consensus, e.g. more than 90% of all nodes have the same opinion
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Along with these assumptions, another important assumption that we
make is that, among the totality of n nodes, there are qn adversarial (Byzan-
tine) nodes4, who may not follow the proposed protocol and who may act
maliciously in order to prevent the consensus (of the honest nodes) from
being achieved.
1.2 Context
To understand the importance of this work to cryptocurrency applications,
consider a situation when there are two contradicting transactions. For ex-
ample, if one transfers all the balance of address A1 to address A2, while the
other transfers all the balance of address A1 to address A3 6= A2. In this case,
neither of the two transactions will be strongly preferred by the nodes of the
network, they can then be declared invalid - just in case. On the other hand,
it would not be a good idea to always declare them invalid, as a malicious
actor (Eve) could be able to exploit this. For example, Eve could place a le-
gitimate transaction, such as buying some goods from a merchant. When she
receives the goods, she publishes a double-spending transaction - as above -
in the hope that both will be canceled, and so he would effectively receive her
money back (or at least take the money away from the merchant). To avoid
this kind of threat, it would be desirable if the first transaction (payment
to the merchant) which, by that time, would have probably gained some
confidence from the nodes, would stay confirmed, and only the subsequent
double-spend gets canceled.
2 Related Work
There is a wide range of classical work on (probabilistic) Byzantine consensus
protocols [2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7]. The disadvantage of the approach of these papers is,
however, that they typically require that the nodes exchange O(n2) messages
in each round (which means O(n) messages for each node). In the situation
where the communicational complexity matters, this can be a major barrier.
A good deal of work focuses on failures within a network infrastructure,
rather than on malicious agents. The work of Liu [8] defines FastBFT,
and which is a fast and scalable BFT (Byzantine fault tolerance) protocol.
Within this, the work integrates trusted execution environments (TEEs) with
lightweight secret sharing, and results in a low latency infrastructure. Crain
et al [9] define Democratic Byzantine Fault Tolerance (DBFT) and which
is a leaderless Byzantine consensus. This provides a robust infrastructure
4where q ∈ [0, 1)
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where there is a failure in the leader of the consensus network. The core
contribution is that nodes will process message whenever they receive them,
instead of waiting for a co-ordinate to confirm messages. Another Byzantine
Fault Tolerant method which does not require a leader node is Honey Badger
[10]. This method is asynchronous in its scope and can cope with corrupted
nodes. Unfortunately, it does not actually make any commitments around
the timing of the delivery of a message, and where even if Eve controls the
scheduling of messages, there will be no impact on the overall consensus.
There has also been much research on the probabilistic models where, in
each round, a node only contacts a small number of other nodes in order to
learn their opinions, and possibly change its own. This type of models is
usually called voter models, and which were introduced in the 70s by Holley
and Liggett [11] and Clifford and Sudbury [12]. A very important observation
is that, in most cases, voter models have only two external invariant measures:
one concentrated on the “all-0” configuration, and the other one concentrated
on the “all-1” – we can naturally call these two configurations “consensus
states”. Since then, there has been a range of work on voter models; in
particular, let us cite [13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18] which are specifically aimed
at reaching consensus and have low communicational complexity (typically,
O(n lnn)). However, in these works, the presence of adversarial nodes is
usually either not allowed, or is supposed to be very minimal.
3 Model Definition
The developed model assumes that adversarial nodes can exchange informa-
tion freely between themselves and can agree on a common strategy. In fact,
they all may be controlled by a single individual or entity. We also assume
that the adversary is omniscient : at each moment of time, he is aware of
the current opinion of every honest node. While this assumption may seem
a bit too extreme, note that the adversarial nodes can query the honest ones
a bit more frequently to be aware of the current state of the network; also,
even if the “too frequent” queries are somehow not permitted, the adversary
can still infer (with some degree of confidence) about the opinion of a given
honest node by analyzing the history of this node’s interactions with all the
adversarial nodes.
The remaining (1 − q)n nodes are honest, i.e., they follow the recom-
mended protocol. We assume that they are numbered from 1 to (1 − q)n;
this will enter into several notations below.
Our protocol will be divided into epochs which we call rounds. The basic
feature of it is that, in each round, each node may query k other nodes about
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their current opinion (i.e., the preferred value of the bit). We allow k to be
relatively large (say, k = 50 or so), but still assume that k  n. We also
assume that the complete list of the nodes is known to all the participants,
and any node can directly query any other node. For the sake of clarity of
the presentation, for now we assume that all nodes (honest and adversarial)
always respond to the queries; in Section 6 we deal with the general situation
when nodes can possibly remain silent. This, by the way, will result in a new
“security threshold” φ−2 ≈ 0.38 (where φ is the Golden Ratio), different from
the “usual” security thresholds 1
2
and 1
3
.
With respect to the behavior of the adversarial nodes, there are two im-
portant cases to be distinguished:
• Cautious adversary5: any adversarial node must maintain the same
opinion in the same round, i.e., respond the same value to all the queries
it receives in that round.
• Berserk adversary : an adversarial node may respond differently to
things for different queries in the same round.
To explain the reason why the adversary may choose to be cautious,
first note that we also assume that nodes have identities and sign all their
messages; this way, one can always prove that a given message originates
from a given node. Now, if a node is not cautious, this may be detected by
the honest nodes (e.g., two honest nodes may exchange their query history
and verify that the same node passed contradicting information to them).
In such a case, the offender may be penalized by all the honest nodes (the
nodes who discovered the fraud would pass that information along, together
with the relevant proof). Since, in the sequel, we will see that the protocol
provides more security and converges faster against a cautious adversary, it
may be indeed a good idea for the honest nodes to adopt additional measures
in order to detect the “berserk” behavior. Also, since k would be typically
large and each node is queried k times on average during each round, we make
a further simplifying assumption that a cautious adversary just chooses (in
some way) the opinions of all his nodes before the current round starts and
then communicates these opinions to whoever asks.
3.1 Generating random numbers
The protocol we are going to describe requires the system to generate, from
time to time (more precisely, once in each round), a random number available
5also know as covert adversary, cf. [19]
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to all the participants (this is very similar to the “global-coin” approach used
in many works on Byzantine consensus, see e.g. [2]). For the sake of clean-
ness of the presentation and the arguments, in this paper we mainly assume
that these random numbers are provided by a trusted source, not controlled
by the adversary6. We observe that such random number generation can be
done in a decentralized way as well (provided that the proportion q of the ad-
versarial nodes is not too large), see e.g. [20, 21, 22, 23, 24]. If a “completely
decentralized” solution proves to be too expensive (from the point of view of
computational and/or communicational complexity), one can consider “in-
termediate” ones, such as using a smaller committee for this, and/or making
use of many publicly available RNGs. It is important to observe that (as we
will see from the analysis below), even if from time to time the adversary
can get (total or partial) control of the random number, this can only lead to
delayed consensus, but he cannot convince different honest nodes of different
things, i.e., safety is not violated. Also, it is not necessary that really all
honest nodes agree on the same number; if most of them do, this is already
fine. This justifies the idea that, in our context, both decentralization and
“strong consensus” are not of utter importance for the specific task of ran-
dom number generation. We postpone the rest of this discussion to Section 6,
since the methods we employ for proving our results are relevant for it.
Before actually describing our protocol, it is important to note that we
assume that there is no central entity that “supervises” the network and can
somehow know that the consensus was achieved and therefore it is time to
stop. This means that each node must decide when to stop using a local rule,
i.e., using only the information locally available to it.
3.2 Parameter setup
The protocol depends on a set of integer and real parameters:
• 1/2 < a ≤ b < 1, the threshold limits in the first round (they are
needed to assure (i)–(ii) on page 2);
• β ∈ (0, 1/2), the threshold limit parameter in the subsequent rounds;
• m0 ∈ N, the cooling-off period;
• ` ∈ N, the number of consecutive rounds (when the cooling-off period is
over) with the same opinion after which it becomes final, for one node.
6i.e., the adversary may be omniscient (knows all information that exists now), but he
is not prescient (cannot know the future)
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Now, let us describe our protocol. First, we assume that each node decides
on the initial value of the bit, according to any reasonable rule7. Then, we
describe the first round of the protocol in the following way:
• in the first round, each honest node j randomly queries other nodes k
times (repetitions and self-queries are allowed8) and records the num-
ber η1(j) of 1-opinions it receives;
• after that, the value of the random variable X1 ∼ U [a, b] is made avail-
able to the nodes9;
• then, each honest node uses the following decision rule: if k−1η1(j) ≥
X1, it adopts opinion 1, otherwise it adopts opinion 0.
In the subsequent rounds, the dynamics is almost the same, we only
change the interval where the uniform random variable lives:
• in the round m ≥ 2, each honest node j randomly queries other nodes k
times, and records the number ηm(j) of 1-opinions it receives;
• after that, the value of the random variable Xm ∼ U [β, 1− β] is made
available to the nodes;
• then, each honest node which does not yet have final opinion uses
the following decision rule: if k−1ηm(j) ≥ Xm, it adopts opinion 1,
otherwise it adopts opinion 0.
As mentioned above, if an honest node has the same opinion during ` con-
secutive rounds after the cooling-off period (i.e., counting from time m0 + 1
on) this opinion becomes final.
7for example, if a node sees a valid transaction x (which does not contradict to prior
transactions) at time t, and during the time interval [t, t + ∆] it does not see any trans-
actions that contradict to x it may initially decide that x is good, setting the value of the
corresponding bit to 1
8we have chosen this mainly to facilitate the subsequent analysis; of course, e.g. query-
ing k other nodes chosen uniformly at random can be analyzed in a similar way, with some
more technical complications because the relevant random variables will not be exactly
Binomial, but only approximately so (it will be Hypergeometric, in fact). In any case, we
will see below that k typically will be much less than
√
n, which makes querying the same
node in the same round quite unlikely.
9U [a, b] stands for the uniform probability distribution on interval [a, b]
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3.3 Consensus mechanism
Let us now explain informally what makes our protocol converge fast to the
consensus even in the Byzantine setting. The general idea is the following:
if the adversary (Eve) knows the decision rules that the honest nodes use,
she can then predict their behaviour and adjust her strategy accordingly, in
order to be able to delay the consensus and further mess with the system.
Therefore, let us make these rules unknown to all the participants, including
Eve. Specifically, even though Eve’s nodes can control (to some extent) the
expected proportion of 1-responses among the k queries, she cannot control
the value that the “threshold” random variable assumes. As a consequence,
the decision threshold X1 will likely be “separated” from that typical pro-
portion.
When this separation happens, the opinions of the honest nodes would
tend very strongly in one of the directions whp. Then, it will be extremely
unlikely that the system leaves this “pre-consensus” state, due to the fact
that the decision thresholds, however random, are always uniformly away
from 0 and 1. Also, we mention that a similar protocol was considered in [25].
However, there only “fixed thresholds” were used, which gives Eve much more
control, so that, in particular, then she could delay the consensus a great deal.
As a last remark, it is important to note that having “independently random
thresholds” (i.e., each node independently chooses its own decision threshold)
is not enough to achieve the effect described above — these “locally random”
decisions will simply average out; that is, having common random numbers
is indeed essential.
4 Results
We define two events relative to the final consensus value:
Hi = {all honest nodes eventually reach final opinion i}, i = 0, 1. (1)
Thus, the union H0 ∪H1 stands for the event that all honest nodes agree on
the same value, i.e., that the consensus was achieved.
For 0 < q < β < 1
2
, abbreviate
ϕβ,q,k =
β − q
2(1− q) − e
− 1
2
k(β−q)2 .
In the following, we assume that k is large enough so that ϕβ,q,k > 0 (indeed,
the first term in the above display is strictly positive, and the second one
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converges to 0 as k →∞). Let us also denote
W (n, k,m0, `, u) = (1− q)n
((
1− (1− e− 12k(β−q)2)`)u + ( e− 12k(β−q)2
1− e− 12k(β−q)2
)`−1)
+ (m0 + `u)e
−2(1−q)nϕ2β,q,k , (2)
and
ψcau(n, k) = 2 exp
(− 1
8
n (β−q)
2
4(1−q)
)
+ (1− 2β)−1
√
2k−1 ln 4(1−q)
β−q , (3)
ψber(n, k) = 2 exp
(− 1
8
n (β−q)
2
4(1−q)
)
+
q +
√
2k−1 ln 4(1−q)
β−q
1− 2β . (4)
(in the above notation, we omit the dependence on q and β). As it will
become clear shortly, we will need W (n, k,m0, `, u) to be small, and ψ’s
(which, as the reader probably have noted, relate to cautious and berserk
adversaries) to be strictly less than 1. It is not difficult to see (we elaborate
more on that below) that (recall that q < β) the value of the expression
in (2) will be small indeed if n is large and k is at least C lnn for a large C.
Then, the first term in the expression in (3) will be very small for large n,
while the second term will also be small for a sufficiently large k. As for (4),
it shares the same first term with (3); the second term, however, will be of
constant order, and if we want it to be strictly less than 1 for a large k, we
need the constraint q < 1− 2β to hold.
Now, we begin formulating our main results. Let N be the number of
rounds until all honest nodes achieve their final opinions. The next result
controls both the number of necessary rounds and the probability that the
final consensus is achieved (i.e., the event H0 ∪H1 occurs):
Theorem 4.1. (i) For any strategy of a cautious adversary, it holds that
P
[
(H0∪H1)∩{N ≤ m0 +`u}
] ≥ 1−W (n, k,m0, `, u)−(ψcau(n, k))m0 .
(5)
(ii) For any strategy of a berserk adversary, we have
P
[
(H0∪H1)∩{N ≤ m0 + `u}
] ≥ 1−W (n, k,m0, `, u)−(ψber(n, k))m0 .
(6)
Note that the only difference between (5) and (6) is in the second terms
of (3) and (4). As we will see in the proofs, these terms enter into the
part which is “responsible” for the estimates on the time moment when the
adversary loses control on the situation which permits one of the opinions to
reach a supermajority; from that moment on, there is essentially no difference
if the adversary is cautious or berserk.
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Corollary 4.2. For a cautious adversary we need that q < β, while for a
berserk adversary we also need that q < 1 − 2β. Recalling also that β must
belong to (0, 1/2), it is not difficult to see that
• for a cautious adversary, for any q < 1/2 and all large enough n we
are able to adjust the parameters k, β,m0, ` in such a way that the
protocol works whp (in particular, a β-value sufficiently close to 1/2
would work);
• however, for a berserk adversary, we are able to do the same only for
q < 1/3 (here, β = 1/3 would work).
Corollary 4.3. One may be interested in asymptotic results, for example, of
the following kind: assume that the number of nodes n is fixed (and large),
and the proportion of Byzantine nodes q is acceptable (i.e., less than 1/2
for the case of cautious adversary, or less than 1/3 for the case of berserk
adversary, as discussed above). We then want to choose the parameters of
the protocol in such a way that the probabilities in (5) and (6) are at least
1 − ε(n), where ε(n) is polynomially small in n (i.e., ε(n) = O(n−h) for
some h > 0).
First, β = 1/3 works in both cases; then, a quick analysis of (5)–(6) shows
that one possibility is: chose k = C lnn (with a sufficiently large constant in
front), ` of constant order, and m0 = O
(
lnn
ln lnn
)
for cautious adversary or
m0 = O(lnn) for a berserk one.
That is, the overall communicational complexity will be at most O
(
n ln2 n
ln lnn
)
for a cautious adversary and O(n ln2 n) for a berserk one.
Next, let pˆ0 be the initial proportion of 1-opinions among the honest
nodes. Our second result shows that if, initially, no significant majority of
nodes prefer 1, then the final consensus will be 0 whp, and if the superma-
jority of nodes prefer 1, then the final consensus will be 1 whp (recall (i)–(ii)
on page 2), and it is valid in the general case (i.e., for both cautious and
berserk adversaries).
Theorem 4.4. (i) First, suppose that pˆ0(1−q)+q < a, and assume that k
is sufficiently large so that
e−2k(a−pˆ0(1−q)−q)
2 ≤ β − q
4(1− q) .
Then, we have
P
[
H0 ∩ {N ≤ m0 + `u}
] ≥ 1− exp (− 1
8
n (β−q)
2
4(1−q)
)−W (n, k,m0, `, u).
(7)
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(ii) Now, suppose that pˆ0(1− q) > b, and assume that k is sufficiently large
so that
e−2k(pˆ0(1−q)−b)
2 ≤ β − q
4(1− q) .
Then, the same estimate (7) holds for P[H1 ∩ {N ≤ m0 + `u}].
We also mention that the estimates (5) and (6) are probably not quite
sharp because we have used some union bounds and other “worst-case” ar-
guments when proving them. For example, for n = 1000, k = 20, β = 1/3,
` = m0 = 10, q = 0.1, the system was simulated
10 five thousand times, with
all of them resulting in consensus after not more than 44 rounds; for these
parameter values, the bounds provided by (5) and (6) are not quite useful.
For more concrete results on the number of necessary rounds until consensus
(with different parameters), see Figure 1. It is interesting to observe that, in
most cases, the protocol finalizes after the minimal number m0 + ` = 10 of
rounds and the probability that it lasts for more than 20 rounds seems to be
very small.
5 Proofs
We start with some preliminaries. Let us recall the Hoeffding’s inequal-
ity [26]: if 0 < γ < p < 1, then
P
[
k−1Sk ≤ γ
] ≤ exp{−2k(p− γ)2}, (8)
and the same estimate also holds for P[k−1Sk ≥ γ] in the case 0 < p < γ < 1.
To better understand the difference between cautious and berserk adver-
saries, look at Figure 2. Here, pˆ is the initial proportion of 1-opinions between
the honest nodes, and the crosses mark the proportion of 1-responses to the k
queries that the honest nodes obtain. The cautious adversary can choose any
p˜ ∈ [pˆ(1− q), pˆ(1− q) + q] (by adjusting the opinions of his nodes appropri-
ately, so that the overall proportion of 1-opinions would be p˜), and then those
crosses will be (mostly) concentrated in the interval of length of order k−1/2
around p˜. On the other hand, the berserk adversary can cause the crosses
to be distributed in any way on the whole interval [pˆ(1 − q), pˆ(1 − q) + q],
10with the simple adversarial strategy “vote for the weakest” aiming to prevent the
honest nodes from achieving supermajority of one of the opinions for as long as possible;
however, we do not believe that the adversary can invent something radically better since,
as we will see below, the adversary loses control completely after such a supermajority is
achieved
11
Figure 1: Number of rounds till the protocol finalizes, with n = 1000, a =
0.75, b = 0.85, m0 = ` = 5, k = 20, and q = 0.1.
0 1
0 1
cautious:
berserk:
pˆ(1− q) pˆ(1− q) + q
 k−1/2
p˜
Figure 2: What cautious and berserk adversaries can achieve
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with some of them even going a bit out of it (on the distance of order k−1/2
again).
Next, we need an auxiliary result on a likely outcome of a round in the
case when the adversary cannot make the typical proportion of 1-responses
to be close to the decision threshold. Let η(j) be the number of 1-responses
among k queries that jth honest node receives; in general, the random vari-
ables (η(j), j = 1, . . . , (1− q)n) are not independent, but they are condition-
ally independent given the adversary’s strategy. (Note that η(j) ∼ B(k, p˜)
with some possibly random p˜ if the adversary is cautious, but the situation
may be more complicated for a berserk one.) For a fixed λ ∈ (0, 1), define a
random variable
pˆ =
1
(1− q)n
(1−q)n∑
j=1
1{η(j) ≥ λk};
so that pˆ is the new proportion of 1-opinions among the honest nodes, given
that the “decision threshold” equals λ. Then, the following result holds:
Lemma 5.1. (i) Assume that, conditioned on any adversarial strategy,
there are some positive c and θ such that η(j) is stochastically domi-
nated by B(k, λ − c) for all j = 1, . . . , (1 − q)n, and P[B(k, λ − c) ≥
λk] ≤ θ. Then, for any v > 0
P[pˆ > θ + v] ≤ e−2(1−q)nv2 . (9)
(ii) Assume that, conditioned on any adversarial strategy, η(j) stochasti-
cally dominates B(k, λ+c) for all j = 1, . . . , (1−q)n, and P[B(k, λ+c) ≤
λk] ≤ θ. Then, for any v > 0
P[pˆ < 1− θ − v] ≤ e−2(1−q)nv2 . (10)
Proof. For (i), we observe that (1 − q)npˆ is stochastically dominated by
B(n, θ), and then (9) follows from (8). The proof of the part (ii) is completely
analogous.
Note that, by (8), P[B(k, λ − c) ≥ λk] ≤ e−2kc2 (and the same holds for
P[B(k, λ+ c) ≤ λk]), so we will normally use Lemma 5.1 with θ = e−2kc2 .
Another elementary fact we need is
Lemma 5.2. Let (ξ
(j)
m ,m ≥ 1), j = 1, . . . , N be N sequences of independent
Bernoulli trials11 with success probability h ∈ (0, 1). For j = 1, . . . , N define
τ
(1)
j = min
{
m ≥ ` : ξ(j)m = ξ(j)m−1 = . . . = ξ(j)m−`+1 = 1
}
11the sequences themselves are not assumed to be independent between each other
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and
τ
(0)
j = min
{
m ≥ ` : ξ(j)m = ξ(j)m−1 = . . . = ξ(j)m−`+1 = 0
}
to be the first moments when runs of ` ones (respectively, zeros) are observed
in jth sequence. Then, for all u ∈ N,
P[τ (1)j ≤ `u, τ (1)j < τ (0)j ] ≥ 1− (1− h`)u −
(1− h
h
)`−1
(11)
for all j = 1, . . . , N , and
P[τ (1)j ≤ `u, τ (1)j < τ (0)j ,∀j = 1, . . . , N ] ≥ 1−N
(
(1− h`)u +
(1− h
h
)`−1)
.
(12)
Proof. First, it is clear that
P[τ (1)j ≤ `u] ≥ 1− (1− h`)u (13)
(divide the time interval [1, `u] into u subintervals of length ` and note that
each of these subintervals is all-1 with probability h`). Then, the following
is an easy exercise on computing probabilities via conditioning (for the sake
of completeness, we prove this fact in the Appendix):
P[τ (1)j < τ
(0)
j ] = 1−
(1− h)`−1(1− h`)
h`−1 + (1− h)`−1 − (h(1− h))`−1 . (14)
Observe that (14) implies that (since 1− h` ≤ 1 and (1− h)`−1 − (h(1−
h))`−1 ≥ 0)
P[τ (1)j < τ
(0)
j ] ≥ 1−
(1− h
h
)`−1
,
and so, using the above together with (13) and the union bound, we ob-
tain (11). The relation (12) is then a direct consequence of (11) (again, with
the union bound).
To prove our main results, we need some additional notation. Let %(j)
be the round when the jth (honest) node finalizes its opinion. Denote
Rm = {j : %(j) ≤ m}
to be the subset of honest nodes that finalized their opinions by round m.
Let also ξˆm(j) be the opinion of jth node after the mth round and
pˆm =
1
(1− q)n
(1−q)n∑
j=1
ξˆm(j) (15)
be the proportion of 1-opinions among the honest nodes after the jth round
in the original system.
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Proof of Theorem 4.1. Let us define the random variable
Ψ = min
{
m ≥ 1 : pˆm ≤ β − q
2(1− q) or pˆm ≥ 1−
β − q
2(1− q)
}
(16)
to be the round after which the proportion of 1-opinions among the honest
nodes either becomes “too small”, or “too large”. We now need the following
fact:
Lemma 5.3. For all s ≤ m0 + `, it holds that (recall (3) and (4))
P[Ψ > s] ≤

(
ψcau(n, k)
)s−1
, for cautious adversary,(
ψber(n, k)
)s−1
, for berserk adversary.
(17)
Proof. Observe that s ≤ m0+` implies that a node cannot finalize its opinion
before round s. Consider first the case of a cautious adversary. Abbreviate
(for this proof) µ = β−q
4(1−q) . Let m ≥ 2 and observe that, for any fixed
h ∈ [0, 1] we have (recall that Xm ∼ U [β, 1− β])
P
[
e−2k(Xm−h)
2 ≥ µ] = P[(Xm − h)2 ≤ lnµ−1
2k
]
= P
[
h−
√
lnµ−1
2k
≤ Xm ≤ h+
√
lnµ−1
2k
]
≤ (1− 2β)−1
√
2 lnµ−1
k
. (18)
Now, assume that p˜m−1 = h. Under this, using (8) and (18), we obtain by
conditioning on the value of Xm
P[pˆm ∈ (2µ, 1− 2µ)] = EP[pˆm ∈ (2µ, 1− 2µ) | Xm]
= E
(
P[pˆm ∈ (2µ, 1− 2µ) | Xm]1{e−2k(Xm−h)2 < µ}
+ P[pˆm ∈ (2µ, 1− 2µ) | Xm]1{e−2k(Xm−h)2 ≥ µ}
)
≤ E(P[pˆm > 2µ | Xm]1{e−2k(Xm−h)2 < µ, h < Xm}
+ P[pˆm < 1− 2µ | Xm]1{e−2k(Xm−h)2 < µ, h > Xm}
+ 1{e−2k(Xm−h)2 ≥ µ})
≤ 2P[((1− q)n)−1B((1− q)n, e−2k(1−µ)) < 1− 2µ]
+ P[e−2k(Xm−h)2 ≥ µ]
≤ ψcau(n, k), (19)
recall (3). This implies the first comparison in (17).
For a berserk adversary, the calculation is quite analogous (recall Fig-
ure 2), so we omit it.
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0 1βqβ−q
2(1−q)
e−
1
2k(β−q)2
β+q
2
β−q
2
pˆm
pˆm(1− q) + q
pˆm+1
e−2k(β−pˆm(1−q)−q)
2
Figure 3: Transition from pˆm to pˆm+1: after mth round, being pˆm ≤ β−q2(1−q) ,
the adversary may “grow” the proportion of 1s to pˆm(1−q)+q ≤ β+q2 . Then,
since the difference between that and “the least possible threshold” β is at
least β−q
2
, the probability that an undecided node would have opinion 1 in the
next round is at most e−
1
2
k(β−q)2 . Then, with overwhelming probability pˆm+1
will be at most β−q
2(1−q) , and so it goes.
Next, we need a result that shows that if one of the opinions has already
reached a supermajority, then this situation is likely to be preserved.
Lemma 5.4. Let m ≥ 2; in the following, A will denote a subset of {1, . . . , (1−
q)n}.
(i) Let G0 be the event that pˆm ≤ β−q2(1−q) , Rm−1 = A, and ξˆm−1(j) = 0 for
all j ∈ A. Then
P
[
pˆm+1 ≤ β − q
2(1− q)
∣∣ G0] ≥ 1− e−2(1−q)nϕ2β,q,k . (20)
(ii) Let G1 be the event that pˆm ≥ 1− β−q2(1−q) , Rm−1 = A, and ξˆm−1(j) = 1
for all j ∈ A. Then
P
[
pˆm+1 ≥ 1− β − q
2(1− q)
∣∣ G1] ≥ 1− e−2(1−q)nϕ2β,q,k . (21)
Proof. We prove only part (i), the proof of the other part is completely
analogous. Now, look at Figure 3: essentially, this is a direct consequence
of Lemma 5.1 with θ = e−2k(
β−q
2
)2 = e−
1
2
k(β−q)2 and v = ϕβ,q,k. Observe
also that, if some honest nodes already decided on 0 definitely, it holds that
(1− q)npˆm+1 is stochastically dominated by B
(
(1− q)n, e− 12k(β−q)2).
Now, we are able to conclude the proof of Theorem 4.1. Let us introduce
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the random variable
Z =

min
{
m > Ψ : pˆm >
β−q
2(1−q)
}
on pˆΨ ≤ β−q2(1−q) ,
min
{
m > Ψ : pˆm < 1− β−q2(1−q)
}
on pˆΨ ≥ 1− β−q2(1−q)
(22)
to be the first moment after Ψ when the honest nodes’ opinion has drifted
away from supermajority. Denote also
τˆ
(1)
j = min
{
m ≥ m0 + ` : ξˆ(j)m = ξˆ(j)m−1 = . . . = ξˆ(j)m−`+1 = 1
}
and
τˆ
(0)
j = min
{
m ≥ m0 + ` : ξˆ(j)m = ξˆ(j)m−1 = . . . = ξˆ(j)m−`+1 = 0
}
.
Next, observe that
(H0 ∪H1) ∩ {N ≤ m0 + `u} ⊂ D1 ∩D2 ∩D3,
where
D1 = {Ψ ≤ m0},
D2 = {Z ≥ m0 + `u},
D3 =
{
there is i ∈ {0, 1} such that τˆ (i)j ≤ m0 + `u, τˆ (i)j < τˆ (1−i)j
for all j = 1, . . . , (1− q)n}.
To obtain the estimates (5) and (6), it is enough to note that the lower
bounds on, respectively, P[D1], P[D2], and P[D3], follow from, respectively,
Lemma 5.3, Lemma 5.4, and Lemma 5.2 (and also the union bound).
Proof of Theorem 4.4. We prove only the part (i); the proof of the other part
is completely analogous. In fact, to obtain the proof it is enough to observe
that, if a− pˆ0(1−q)−q > 0 and e−2k(a−pˆ0(1−q)−q)2 ≤ β−q4(1−q) , then, by (8), with
probability at least 1− exp (− 1
8
n (β−q)
2
4(1−q)
)
it happens that pˆ1 ≤ β−q2(1−q) (so, in
particular, Ψ = 1); next, the same argument as in the proof of Theorem 4.1
does the work.
6 Further generalizations
In this section we argue that our protocol is robust, that is, it is possible
to adapt it in such a way that it is able to work well in more “practical”
situations. Specifically, observe that nodes may not always respond queries,
and the adversarial nodes sometimes may do so deliberately. The protocol de-
scribed in Section 3 is not designed to handle this, so it needs to be amended.
There are at least two natural ways to deal with this situation:
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(i) let each node to take the decision based on the responses that it effec-
tively received (i.e., instead of k−1ηm(j) use ηm(j)/ζm(j), where ζm(j) is
the number of responses that the jth node received in the mth round);
(ii) each node queries more than k nodes, say, 2k or more; since whp the
number of responses received will be at least k (for definiteness, let
us assume that the probability that a query is left unresponded is less
than 1
2
), the node then keeps exactly k responses and discards the rest;
and it is of course also possible to combine them. The practical difference
between these two options is probably not so big; for the sake of formulating
the results in a more clean way, let us assume that a node simply issues
queries sequentially until getting exactly k responses.
Now, we define the notion of a semi-cautious adversary: every node it
controls will not give contradicting responses (i.e., 0 to one node and 1 to
another node in the same round) but can sometimes remain silent; since it
does not make sense for a node to remain silent altogether in a given round
(that would just reduce the fraction of the adversarial nodes in the network),
there are two possible adversarial node behaviours:
• a node answers “0” to some queries and does not answer other queries;
• a node answers “1” to some queries and does not answer other queries.
Here is the result we have for a semi-cautious adversary:
Theorem 6.1. If the adversary is semi-cautious, assume that 1
2−q − β +√
2k−1 ln 4(1−q)
β−q < 1− 2β. Then, for any adversarial strategy, we have
P
[
(H0 ∪H1) ∩ {N ≤ m0 + `u}
] ≥ 1− (ψsemi(n, k))m0 −W (n, k,m0, `, u),
(23)
where
ψsemi(n, k) = 2 exp
(− 1
8
n (β−q)
2
4(1−q)
)
+
1
2−q − β +
√
2k−1 ln 4(1−q)
β−q
1− 2β . (24)
In this situation, the fact corresponding to Corollary 4.2 will be the fol-
lowing (in particular, note the new “security threshold” φ−2 ∈ (1
3
, 1
2
) that we
obtain here):
Corollary 6.2. For a semi-cautious adversary, we need that 1
2−q−β < 1−2β,
or, equivalently, q < 2− 1
1−β (it is only in this case that we will be able to find
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large enough k such that the hypothesis of Theorem 6.1 is satisfied). Since we
also still need that q < β, solving β = 2− 1
1−β , we obtain that q must be less
than 3−
√
5
2
= 1
1+φ
= φ−2 ≈ 0.38, where φ = 1+
√
5
2
is the Golden Ratio. Then,
as before, it is straightforward to show that, for a semi-cautious adversary,
for any q < 1
1+φ
and all large enough n we are able to adjust the parameters
k, β,m0, ` in such a way that the protocol works whp (in particular, a β-value
sufficiently close to 1
1+φ
would work).
Proof of Theorem 6.1. As observed before, an “always-silent” strategy is not
interesting for an adversarial node, since this will, in practice, only reduce
their quantity. Now, assume that, for some γ ∈ [0, 1],
• γqn adversarial nodes reply “0” or remain silent;
• (1− γ)qn adversarial nodes reply “1” or remain silent.
Then, if the adversary wants to decrease a honest node’s confidence in the
1-opinion, those nodes who may answer “1” will remain silent, and so with
probability 1−q
1−q+γq the response will be obtained from a honest node, while
with probability γq
1−q+γq the response will be obtained from an adversarial
node. This gives
pˆ
1− q
1− q + γq =
pˆ(1− q)
1− (1− γ)q
as the “lower limit” for the (expected) proportion of 1s in the queries. Anal-
ogously, if the adversary wants to increase an honest node’s confidence in the
1-opinion those nodes who may answer “0” will remain silent, and so with
probability 1−q
1−q+(1−γ)q the response will be obtained from a honest node, while
with probability (1−γ)q
1−q+(1−γ)q the response will be obtained from an adversarial
node. This gives
pˆ
1− q
1− q + (1− γ)q +
(1− γ)q
1− q + (1− γ)q =
pˆ(1− q) + (1− γ)q
1− γq
as the corresponding “upper limit”. So, analogously to Figure 2, the semi-
cautious adversary can achieve the “crosses” to be distributed on the interval
Iγ :=
[ pˆ(1− q)
1− (1− γ)q ,
pˆ(1− q) + (1− γ)q
1− γq
]
(25)
in any way. Now, it is elementary to see that both endpoints of the above in-
terval decrease when γ increases; if we want to make it symmetric (around 1
2
),
we need to solve
pˆ(1− q)
1− (1− γ)q = 1−
pˆ(1− q) + (1− γ)q
1− γq ,
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0 11− β
β Iγ∗
Iγ2
Iγ1
Figure 4: The “intervals of control” of a semi-cautious adversary, for γ1 <
γ∗ < γ2
or, equivalently
pˆ
1− (1− γ)q =
1− pˆ
1− γq
for γ. This gives the solution γ∗ = q−1(2pˆ−1)+(1− pˆ). After substituting γ∗
to (25), the symmetrized interval becomes
Iγ∗ =
[1− q
2− q ,
1
2− q
]
(somewhat unexpectedly, because it doesn’t depend on pˆ anymore). It is
actually worth noting that γ∗ does not necessarily belongs to [0, 1] (so it is
not always possible to make this interval symmetric), but it does not pose a
problem due to the following. Look at Figure 4: due to the monotonicity,
max
γ∈[0,1]
∣∣[β, 1− β] ∩ Iγ∣∣ ≤ 1
2− q − β : (26)
indeed, for all γ we see that either the interval [β, 1−q
2−q ) or the interval (
1
2−q , 1−
β] is a subset of [β, 1− β] \ Iγ.
This essentially takes care of the argument in the proof of Lemma 5.3
(since we now understand what is the minimal length of the interval that the
adversary cannot control), and the rest of the proof is completely analogous to
that of Theorem 4.1: indeed, as observed before, the adversary loses control
after the random time Ψ.
We also observe that Theorem 4.4 remains valid also for a semi-cautious
adversary.
Next, let us discuss what do we really need from the (decentralized) ran-
dom number generator. In fact, it is not so much: we need that, regardless
of the past, with probability at least θ (where θ > 0 is a fixed parameter)
the next outcome is a uniform random variable which is “unpredictable” for
the adversary; this random number is seen by at least (1-δ) proportion of
honest nodes, where δ is reasonably small. What we can prove in such a
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situation depends on what the remaining δ(1− q)n honest nodes use as their
decision thresholds: they can use some “second candidate” (in case there
is an alternative source of common randomness), or they can choose their
thresholds independently and randomly, etc. Each of such situations would
need to be treated separately, which is certainly doable, but left out of this
paper. Let us note, though, that the “worst-case” assumption is that the
adversary can “feed” the (fake) decision thresholds to those δ(1 − q)n hon-
est nodes. This would effectively mean that these nodes would behave as
cautious adversaries in the next round (which matters if the random time Ψ
did not yet occur). Therefore, for the sake of obtaining bounds like (5)–(6)
and (23) we can simply pretend that the value of q is increased by δ.
Now, assuming that δ = 0, it is easy to figure out how this will affect our
results: indeed, in our proofs, all random thresholds matter only until Ψ. It
is then straightforward to obtain the following fact:
Proposition 6.3. Assume the above on the random number generation (with
θ ∈ (0, 1) and δ = 0). Then, the estimates (5)–(6) and (23) remain valid
with 1− θ + θψ∗(n, k) on the place of ψ∗(n, k) (with ∗ ∈ {cau, ber, semi}).
In view of the above result, let us stress that one of the main ideas of
this paper is: we use a “rather weak” consensus (on the random numbers,
as above) to obtain a “strong” consensus on the value of a bit (i.e., validity
of a transaction). Also, let us observe that a partial control of the random
numbers does not give access to a lot of power (in the worst case the adversary
would delay the consensus a bit, but that is all), so there is not much need
to be restrictive on the degree of decentralization for that part12: a smaller
subcommittee can take care of the random numbers’ generation, and some
VDF-based random number generation scheme (such as [21]) may be used to
further prevent this subcommittee from leaking the numbers before the due
time).
7 Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper we described a consensus protocol which is able to withstand
a substantial proportion of Byzantine nodes, and obtained some explicit es-
timates on its safety and liveness. A special feature of our protocol is that
it uses a sequence of random numbers (produced by some external source
or by the nodes themselves) in order to have a “randomly moving decision
threshold” which quickly defeats the adversary’s attempts to mess with the
12in other words, it may make sense that different parts of the system are decentralized
to a different degree, there is nothing a priory wrong with it
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consensus. It is also worth noting that the “quality” of those random num-
bers is not critically important – only the estimates on Ψ (Lemma 5.3) will be
affected in a non-drastic way. In particular, one can permit that the random
numbers might be biased, or even that the adversary might get control of
these numbers from time to time. Also, it is clear from the proofs that there
is no need for the honest nodes to achieve consensus on the actual values of
these random numbers: if some (not very large) proportion of honest nodes
does not see the same number as the others, this will not cause problems.
All this is due to the fact that, when the proportion of 1-opinions among
the honest nodes becomes “too small” or “too large” (i.e., less than β−q
2(1−q)
or greater than 1 − β−q
2(1−q) in our proofs), the adversary does not have any
control anymore.
We need to comment on anti-Sybil measure in practical implementations:
indeed, it would be quite unfortunate if the adversary is able to deploy an
excessively large number of nodes, thus inflating the value of q. One of
the possible approaches is using a variant of Proof-of-Stake; with it, when
querying, one needs to choose the node proportionally to its weight (stake).
Of course, one may consider also further modifications of the protocol.
For example, one can get rid of the cooling-off period or make its length
depend on the “strength” of the prevailing opinion in the first rounds (but
then ` should probably be increased), consider different final acceptance rules
(for example, at least ` − y node’s opinions among the last ` must be the
same), and so on.
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A Appendix
Here we prove a simple fact about runs of zeros and ones in a sequence
of Bernoulli trials, which will imply (14). Namely, let ξ1, ξ2, ξ3, . . . be i.i.d.
random variables with P[ξi = 1] = 1− P[ξi = 0] = h, and let, for r, s ∈ N
τ = min{m ≥ r : ξm = ξm−1 = . . . = ξm−r+1 = 1}
and
σ = min{m ≥ s : ξm = ξm−1 = . . . = ξm−s+1 = 0}
to be the first moments when we see runs of r ones (respectively, s zeros).
Proposition A.1. It holds that
P[τ < σ] =
hr−1(1− (1− h)s)
hr−1 + (1− h)s−1 − hr−1(1− h)s−1 . (27)
Proof. To prove (27), we use conditioning. Abbreviate p0 = P[τ < σ | ξ1 = 0]
and p1 = P[τ < σ | ξ1 = 1]. Then, conditioning on the number of consecutive
zeros in the beginning, we write
p0 =
s−1∑
j=1
(1− h)j−1hp1 = (1− (1− h)s−1)p1, (28)
and, conditioning on the number of consecutive ones in the beginning, we
obtain that
p1 =
r−1∑
j=1
hj−1(1− h)p0 +
∞∑
j=r
hj−1(1− h)× 1 = (1− hr−1)p0 + hr−1. (29)
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Solving (28)–(29) for p0,1 yields
p0 =
hr−1(1− (1− h)s−1)
hr−1 + (1− h)s−1 − hr−1(1− h)s−1 ,
p1 =
hr−1
hr−1 + (1− h)s−1 − hr−1(1− h)s−1 ,
and we then obtain (27) by using the obvious relation P[τ < σ] = (1−h)p0 +
hp1.
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